Rebel Wilson succeeds in defamation fight brought by lead actor

Richard Mitry

On 22 July 2026, the Federal Court of Australia dismissed Charlotte MacInnes' defamation proceeding against Rebel Wilson. The judgment of Justice Raper is a useful case study in how Australian courts are now approaching defamation claims arising from social media, and in particular how the serious harm threshold introduced in 2021 operates in practice.

Background

The dispute arose out of the making of the film The Deb. Ms MacInnes was the lead actor. Ms Wilson was a co-star, director and co-producer. Ms Amanda Ghost described herself as the lead producer and financier of the film.

The events at the centre of the case occurred on 5 September 2023. Ms Ghost and Ms MacInnes went swimming at Bondi Beach in the cold early evening. Ms Ghost had warned Ms MacInnes that she had previously suffered an adverse reaction to cold water. After the swim the Court heard that the two women returned to the apartment they were sharing, and both showered and bathed in the same bathroom at the same time.

Ms Wilson subsequently stated publicly that Ms MacInnes complained to her the following day, in her capacity as director, that Ms Ghost had asked her to have a bath and a shower with her and that this had made her feel uncomfortable. Ms Wilson further stated that Ms MacInnes later walked that complaint back, and that this occurred against the background of Ms MacInnes being cast by Ms Ghost in the lead role in a production of Gatsby and being given a record deal.

Ms MacInnes sued over four Instagram publications made between September 2024 and July 2025, two on Ms Wilson's personal account and two on the account for the film. She also brought a claim in equity for breach of confidence. Ms Wilson denied that the pleaded imputations were conveyed or were defamatory, and pleaded justification under section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW).

Which state's law applied

The first issue was whether the substantive law of Western Australia or New South Wales applied. Under section 11(2) of the uniform defamation legislation, where there is publication in more than one Australian jurisdiction the court applies the law of the jurisdiction with which the harm occasioned by the publication as a whole has its closest connection.

Her Honour held that New South Wales law applied. Ms MacInnes was ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom at the time of publication, not Western Australia. She had lived and worked in New South Wales during the formative period of her professional reputation between 2021 and 2024, and the critical events were New South Wales events. That Ms MacInnes had spent her childhood and early adulthood in Western Australia carried limited weight, and the evidence of reputational harm in that state was very limited.

Of particular practical importance, her Honour confirmed that the harm referred to in section 11(3)(c) is reputational harm and not emotional harm or hurt to feelings. The fact that Ms MacInnes happened to be in Western Australia when she saw one of the posts was not to the point.

What the posts actually conveyed

The consequence of the choice of law finding was that Ms MacInnes bore the onus of establishing serious harm to reputation under section 10A. Before reaching that question, her Honour first determined whether the pleaded imputations were carried.

The judgment reiterates the now settled approach to social media publications. The medium is casual, conversational and fast moving. Readers scroll, form a fleeting and impressionistic reaction, and move on. Elaborate parsing of a post for its theoretically deducible meaning is to be avoided, and the court must arrive at a single objective meaning by reference to the ordinary reasonable reader.

Applying that approach, her Honour found that only one meaning was conveyed, and only by the first post of 23 September 2024, namely that Ms MacInnes had changed her story about feeling uncomfortable about what happened with the producer in the bathroom. The more serious pleaded imputations were not carried. The ordinary reader would not have understood that there was any relevant exchange or arrangement, that Ms MacInnes had been paid off, or that she had been the victim of sexual harassment and was falsely denying it.

Her Honour then held that the surviving imputation was not defamatory. An assertion that a person changed their story, for which there could be innumerable reasons, does not, measured objectively against community standards, lower that person in the estimation of ordinary right thinking members of society.

The pleaded meanings for the later three posts depended on the reader having read and retained one of the earlier posts. Given that the posts remained viewable for 24 hours and retrievable for a further 48 hours, her Honour was not persuaded that the ordinary reasonable reader would have done so.

Serious harm

Although it was not strictly necessary, her Honour went on to consider serious harm. Ms MacInnes failed on this element as well.

Her Honour accepted that there had been broad republication, largely through media coverage of the related litigation. However, the extent of publication is not decisive and serious harm is not a numbers game. What was missing was evidence of actual impact. There was no evidence of any lost opportunity or adverse professional consequence. Ms MacInnes performed in Gatsby, signed a recording contract with Atlantic Records in October 2025 and released two singles.

Two findings are particularly notable. First, her Honour rejected the submission that Ms Wilson's profile meant her claims carried particular weight, finding instead that there is considerable circumspection in the industry and among the public about claims made by Ms Wilson. The reputation of the publisher can therefore reduce as well as increase the harm a publication is capable of causing. Second, her Honour held that the subjective views of individual witnesses about what the posts conveyed to them were of very limited probative value, because serious harm must be assessed against the meaning objectively determined by the court.

Justification

Had the claim survived, the justification defence would have succeeded.

Her Honour expressed misgivings about the credit of each of Ms MacInnes, Ms Ghost and Ms Wilson. That circumstance placed decisive weight on the contemporaneous record. The most significant document was an email sent by Ms MacInnes' agent on 18 September 2023, which Ms MacInnes accepted at trial was her slated and unequivocal position at the time. That account differed materially from her later evidence, described a direct conversation with Ms Wilson about the incident, and recorded that Ms Wilson's follow up call had made her feel supported. It was consistent with a complaint having been made and then withdrawn.

Her Honour found that Ms MacInnes did complain to Ms Wilson on 6 September 2023 about feeling uncomfortable, and thereafter changed her story. Importantly, the court was not required to decide, and did not decide, whether Ms MacInnes had in fact been sexually harassed. The sting to be justified was the change of story, not the underlying conduct.

Breach of confidence

The equitable claim failed at the threshold. Ms MacInnes identified the confidential information as a complaint of sexual harassment. Since the court found that what was made was a complaint of feeling uncomfortable, capable of explanation on grounds not involving sexual harassment, the information relied upon was never established. Her Honour also rejected the proposition that a complaint made to an employer inherently carries the necessary quality of confidence, noting the range of positive statutory and common law obligations that require employers to act on complaints.

The application was dismissed with costs.

This article is general information only and is not legal advice. Please contact us if you would like advice on your particular circumstances.